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CASE COMMENTS
NLRB HAS No JURISDICTION OVER LAY TEACHERS IN
PAROCHIAL SCHOOLS
NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979)
In NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago' the Supreme Court evaded a
first amendment challenge to the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA)2 as applied to lay faculty members employed by church-oper-
ated schools.
The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), after ordering repre-
sentation elections3 for lay teachers at two Catholic high schools in
Chicago4 and five secondary schools in the Diocese of Fort Wayne-
South Bend,5 certified two union organizations as the teachers' exclu-
sive bargaidiing agents.6 The schools refused to recognize the unions,
and the unions filed unfair labor practice complaints with the NLRB.7
1. 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1976).
3. The Catholic Bishop of Chicago, A Corporation Sole, 220 N.L.R.B. 359, 90 L.R.R.M.
1225 (1975). Section 9 of the NLRA describes the Board's authority:
(c)(1) Whenever a petition shall have been filed, in accordance with such regulations as
may be prescribed by the Board-
(A) by an employee or group of employees or any individual or labor organization
acting in their behalf alleging that a substantial number of employees (i) wish to be
represented for collective bargaining and that their employer declines to recognize
their representative as the representative defined in subsection (a) of this section....
the Board shall investigate such petition and if it has reasonable cause to believe that a
question of representation affecting commerce exists shall provide for an appropriate
hearing upon due notice .... If the Board finds upon the record of such hearing that
such a question of representation exists, it shall direct an election by secret ballot and
shall certify the results thereof.
29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1) (1976).
4. The two high schools in Chicago, Quigley North and Quigley South, employed 46 teach-
ers. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 6 n.2, NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490
(1979).
5. South Bend St. Joseph High School, Mishawaka Marian High School, Fort Wayne
Bishop Luers High School, Fort Wayne Bishop Dwenger High School, and Huntington Catholic
High School employed 182 lay teachers. Id.
6. In the Board supervised election at the Quigley schools, the Quigley Education Alliance,
a union affiliated with the Illinois Education Association, prevailed and was certified as the exclu-
sive bargaining representative. In the Diocese of Fort Wayne-South Bend, the Community Alli-
ance for Teachers of Catholic High Schools, a similar union organization, prevailed and was
certified. 440 U.S. at 494.
7. The unions alleged two unfair labor practices. NLRA § 8 (a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1)
(1976), makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer "to interfere with, restrain, or coerce
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The Board ordered the schools to cease their unfair labor practices and
to bargain collectively with the unions.8 On petition of the schools, the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that the NLRB's assertion of
jurisdiction over the religiously affiliated schools violated the first
amendment religion clauses, and denied the Board's cross-petition for
enforcement of its orders.9 The Supreme Court affirmed the Seventh
Circuit's refusal to enforce the Board's orders and held In the absence
of a clear expression by Congress of its intent to include lay teachers at
church-operated schools within the scope of the NLRA, the NLRB
lacks jurisdiction over religiously affiliated schools and the Court will
decline to resolve the first amendment issues arising out of the exercise
of such jurisdiction.' 0
When confronted with a challenge to a statute's constitutionality, a
court "will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly
possible by which the question may be avoided.""II To construe a stat-
ute against its validity, the court must find that Congress clearly ex-
pressed an affirmative intention in favor of that construction.12 Courts,
however, may not "substitute amendment for construction" merely to
save a law from conflict with a constitutional limitation, '3 nor press the
employees in the exercise of [their guaranteed] rights." NLRA § 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5)
(1976), makes it unlawful for an employer "to refuse to bargain collectively with the representa-
fives of his employees."
8. Diocese of Fort Wayne-South Bend, Inc., 224 N.L.R.B. 1226, 92 L.R.R.M. 1550 (1976);
The Catholic Bishop of Chicago, A Corporation Sole, 224 N.L.R.B. 1221, 92 L.R.R.M. 1553
(1976).
9. The Catholic Bishop of Chicago, A Corporation Sole v. NLRB, 559 F.2d 1112 (7th Cir.
1977).
10. 440 U.S. at 507.
11. "When the validity of an act of Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious
doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain
whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided."
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932). See Lorilland v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 577 (1978); Swain
v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 378 (1977); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 760 (1974); Pernell v. Southall
Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 365 (1974); United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 369
(1971); United States v. Jin Fuey Moy, 241 U.S. 394, 401 (1916).
12. Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, 353 U.S. 138, 147 (1957); accord, McCulloch v. So-
ciedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10 (1963).
13. Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 271 U.S. 500, 518 (1926).
[I]t is the duty of a court in considering the validity of an act to give it such reasonable
construction as can be reached to bring it within the fundamental law. But it is very
clear that amendment may not be substituted for construction and that a court may not
exercise legislative functions to save the law from conflict with constitutional limitation.
Id. See Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 515 (1964); Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345, 357
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principle to a point of "disingenuous evasion." 14
The brevity of the first amendment's religion clauses and the abso-
lute terms in which the amendment was cast have provided the courts
with a continuing source of difficulty in evaluating the constitutional
validity of legislation and governmental activity affecting religion.' 5
The first amendment provides in part that "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof."' 6 Carried to their logical extreme, the establishment 7 and
free exercise' 8 clauses often overlap and conflict in their application to
n.
2 1 (1956); Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 31 (1948); United States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S.
689, 693 (1948); Hopkins Savings Ass'n v. Cleary, 296 U.S. 315, 335 (1935).
14. "A statute must be construed, if fairly possible, so as to avoid not only the conclusion
that it is unconstitutional, but also grave doubts upon that score .. " But avoidance of
a difficulty will not be pressed to the point of disingenuous evasion. Here the intention
of the Congress is revealed too distinctly to permit us to ignore it because of mere mis-
givings as to power. The problem must be faced and answered.
Moore Ice Cream Co. v. Rose, 289 U.S. 373, 379 (1933) (citation omitted).
15. See generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 848-94
(1978).
16. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
17. The establishment clause proscribes governmental action that either advances or inhibits
religion or religious institutions. In its struggle to articulate precise standards for anlayzing estab-
lishment clause challenges, the Supreme Court has formulated a three-prong test. First, the gov-
ernmental activity must have a legitimate secular purpose. See Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229,
236 (1977); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963). Second, the direct and
immediate effect of the governmental activity must be secular and neither advance nor inhibit
religion. See Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 773
(1973) (direct and immediate effect); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (principle or
primary effect). Third, the activity must not foster excessive governmental entanglement with
religion. See Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 236 (1977); Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426
U.S. 736, 748 (1976).
18. The free exercise clause protects the individual from governmental interference with his
religious beliefs or practices. Religious freedom consists of "freedom to believe and freedom to
act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be. Conduct remains
subject to regulation for the protection of society." Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 292, 303-04
(1940); accord, Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 603-04 (1961). The belief-conduct distinction is
troublesome, yet necessary. Carried to its logical extreme, government could prohibit all exercises
of religion on the ground that it was regulating conduct, not belief; on the other hand, the distinc-
tion must be recognized to balance the state's interest in controlling antisocial conduct against the
individual's interest in freedom of worship. See generally J. NOwAK,, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG,
supra note 15, at 871-85. To resolve this dilemma, the Court apparently will hold valid a regula-
tion only when the government demonstrates it to be both necessary to the promotion of a compel-
ling state interest, see, eg., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972) ("only those interests...
not otherwise served... can overbalance" interest in religious freedom), and the least burden-
some alternative to accomplishing the legislative goal, see, e.g., Sherbert v. Verer, 374 U.S. 398,
407 (1963) (state must "demonstrate that no alternative forms of regulation" would curb abuses of
unemployment benefits "without infringing First Amendment rights").
Washington University Open Scholarship
176 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 58:173
the facts and circumstances of any given case.19 To further complicate
freedom-of-religion analysis, the Supreme Court has reviewed claims
under the two clauses on independent bases and developed separate
tests for determining whether a governmental activity violates either
clause. 20
The NLRB until recently was able "to steer a course between the
Scylla and Charybdis of the Establishment and Free Exercise
Clauses"'" by declining to exercise jurisdiction over nonprofit educa-
tional institutions. Although authorized to exercise jurisdiction to the
fullest extent constitutionally permissible under the commerce clause,22
the Board in Trustees of Columbia University23 refused to assert juris-
diction over Columbia University, a nonprofit educational institution,
because to do so would not "effectuate the policies of the Act." 24 Even
19. "There is a natural antagonism between a command not to establish a religion and a
command not to inhibit its practice. This tension between the clauses often leaves the Court with
having to choose between competing values in religion cases." J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J.
YOUNG, supra note 15, at 849. See generally Meiklejohn, Religion in the Burger Court: The Herl-
tage of Mr. Justice Black, 10 IND. L. REV. 645 (1977).
20. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 15, at 849.
21. Catholic Bishop of Chicago v. NLRB, 559 F.2d 1112, 1131 (7th Cir. 1977) (Sprecher, J.,
concurring). See generally Batress, Government Regulation and the First Amendment Religion
Clauses-An Analysis of the NLRB's Jurisdiction Over Parochial Schools and Their Teachers, 17
DUQ. L. REV. 291 (1978); Note, The Religion Clauses and NLRB Jursidiction Over Parochial
Schools, 54 NOTRE DAME LAW. 263 (1978); Comment, The Free Exercise Clause, the NLRA, and
Parochial School Teachers, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 631 (1978); 9 SETON HALL L. REV. 333 (1978); 24
WAYNE L. REv. 1439 (1978); 1978 Wis. L. REV. 927 (1978).
22. "While the pending bill of course does not intend to go beyond the constitutional power
of Congress, as that power may be marked out by the courts, it seeks the full limit of that power to
prevent these unfair labor practices." 79 CONG. REC. 7572 (1935) (remarks of Sen. Wagner),
Accord, NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 371 U.S. 224, 226 (1963) ("Congress intended to and
did vest in the Board the fullestjursidictional breadth constitutionally permissible under the Com-
merce Clause") (emphasis in original); Polish Nat'l Alliance v. NLRB, 322 U.S. 643, 648 (1944);
NLRB v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 602, 607 (1939); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1,
30-31 (1937). The Fainblatt Court elaborated:
The Act on its face thus evidences the intention of Congress to exercise whatever power
is constitutionally given to it to regulate commerce by the adoption of measures for the
prevention or control of certain specified acts-unfair labor practices-which provoke or
tend to provoke strikes or labor disturbances affecting interstate commerce. Given the
other needful conditions, commerce may be affected in the same manner and to the same
extent in proportion to its volume, whether it be great or small. Examining the Act in
light of its purpose and of the circumstances in which it must be applied we can perceive
no basis for inferring any intention of Congress to make the operation of the Act depend
on any particular volume of commerce affected more than that to which courts would
apply the maxim de minimis.
306 U.S. at 607.
23. 97 N.L.R.B. 424, 29 L.R.R.M. 1098 (1951).
24. Id. at 425, 29 L.R.R.M. at 1099.
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though the University's activities satisfied the jurisdictional amount
standards established by the Board to invoke its jurisdiction,25 the
NLRB reasoned that these activities were not "commercial in the gen-
erally accepted sense." 26
In 1970, however, the NLRB reversed its position in Cornell Univer-
sil, 27 declaring that the increased involvement in commerce by educa-
tional institutions warranted the Board's scrutiny.28 A year later the
25. The Board enunciated the need for jurisdictional amount standards in Hollow Tree Lum-
ber Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 635, 26 L.R.R.M. 1543 (1950):
The Board has long been of the opinion that it would better effectuate the purposes of
the Act, and promote the prompt handling of major cases, not to exercise its jurisdiction
to the fullest extent possible under the authority delegated to it by Congress, but to limit
that exercise to enterprises whose operations have or at which labor would have, a pro-
nounced impact upon the flow of interstate commerce ....
d. at 636, 26 L.R.R.M. at 1543. The Board established the following minimum dollar standards:
direct inflow $500,000 (Federal Dairy Co., Inc., 91 N.L.R.B. 638, 26 L.R.R.M. 1538 (1950)); indi-
rect inflow $1 million (Dorn's House of Miracles, Inc., 91 N.L.R.B. 632,26 L.R.R.M. 1545 (1950));
direct outflow $25,000 (Stanislaus Implement and Hardware Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 618, 26 L.R.R.M.
1548 (1950)); indirect outflow $50,000 (Hollow Tree Lumber Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 635, 26 L.R.R.M.
1543 (1950)). Satisfying any one of these requirements suffices to bring the employer under Board
jurisdiction. Trustees of Columbia University, 97 N.L.R.B. 424, 425 n.2, 29 L.R.R.M. 1098, 1098
n.2 (1951). These minimum dollar requirements are presently codified in 29 C.F.R. § 103.1
(1979).
26. 97 N.L.R.B. at 425, 29 L.R.R.M. at 1098. The National Labor Relations Board, citing the
growth of the commerce power, does not exempt organizations from the operation of the Act
"where the particular activities involved have been commercial in the generally accepted sense."
Id. The Board's approach to nonprofit organizations is particularly enlightening. See, e.g., Sun-
day School Board of the Southern Baptist Convention, 92 N.L.R.B. 801, 27 L.R.R.M. 1153 (1951)
(corporation publishing religious literature); Port Arthur College, 92 N.L.R.B. 152, 27 L.R.R.M.
1055 (1950) (college operating a commercial radio station); Illinois Inst. of Technology, 81
N.L.R.B. 201, 23 L.R.R.M. 1312 (1949) (college and affiliated foundations performing industrial
research sponsored by business concerns); Association Canado-Americaine, 72 N.L.R.B. 520, 19
L.R.R.M. 1196 (1947) (organization in insurance business); Henry Ford Trade School, 63
N.L.R.B. 1134, 17 L.R.R.M. 55 (1945), 58 N.L.R.B. 1535, 15 L.R.R.M. 126 (1944) (vocational
program for industry); American Medical Assoc., 39 N.L.R.B. 385, 10 L.R.R.M. 15 (1942) (pub-
lishing medical journals, pamphlets, and magazines).
27. 183 N.L.R.B. 329, 74 L.R.R.M. 1269 (1970).
28. In particular, the Board noted that Cornell University was the largest employer in
Tompkins County, New York. Id. at 330, 74 L.R.R.M. at 1271.
The Board's change in attitude is due, in part, to its interpretation of Congress' response to the
Supreme Court's decision in Guss v. Utah Labor Board, 353 U.S. 1 (1957). In Guss the Court
disallowed state legislation covering an area under the NLRB's statutory jurisdiction even though
the Board had declined to assert jurisdiction over that area. 353 U.S. at 6-10. Concerned with this
potentially ungoverned area, Congress in 1959 passed an amendment granting the Board discre-
tion to "decline to assert jurisdiction over any labor dispute involving any class or category of
employers where, in the opinion of the Board, the effect of such labor dispute on commerce is not
sufficiently substantial to warrant the exercise of its jurisdiction." 29 U.S.C. § 164 (c)(1)(1976).
The Board interpreted § 14(c)(1) in Cornell University to "impliedly [confirm] the Board's author-
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Board first asserted jurisdiction over a nonprofit secondary school that
met the jurisdictional amount requirements, 29 but not until 1974 did
the NLRB exercise jurisdiction over a religiously affiliated private
school.30
During the interim, the Board declined to assert jurisdiction over two
church-operated schools, 31 but insisted that the religious component of
the schools was not the determinative factor; rather, the schools had
only a minimal impact on commerce.3 2 In 1975, however, the Board
announced in Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Baltimore3 3 that it would
not assert jurisdiction over "completely religious," as distinguished
from 'just religiously associated," nonprofit educational institutions.34
ity to expand its jurisdiction to any class of employers whose operations substantially affect com-
merce." 183 N.L.R.B. at 331, 74 L.R.R.M. at 1272. The Board saw § 14(c) as "manifestfing] a
congressional policy favoring such assertion where the Board finds that the operations of a class of
employers exercise a substantial effect on commerce." Id. at 332, 74 L.R.R.M. at 1272. Thus, the
Board found cause for reversing the Columbia decision. Id. at 334, 74 L.R.R.M. at 1275. See also
Hotel Employees Local 225 v. NLRB, 358 U.S. 99 (1958) (per curiam) (Board's refusal to exercise
jurisdiction over hotel industry runs contrary to congressional intent); Office Employees Interna-
tional Union, Local 11 v. NLRB, 353 U.S. 313 (1957) (Board's refusal to assert jurisdiction over
unions acting as employers contravenes congressional intent).
29. Shattuck School, 189 N.L.R.B. 886,77 L.R.R.M. 1164 (1971) (gross revenue of $1,174,000
amounted to substantial impact on commerce). See also Judson School, 209 N.L.R.B. 677, 86
L.R.R.M. 1248 (1974).
30. See Henry M. Hald High School Assoc., 213 N.L.R.B. 415, 87 L.R.R.M. 1403 (1974).
Responding to the argument that NLRB jurisdiction over church-operated schools would violate
the first amendment, the Board affirmed the Administrative Law Judge's statement that: "Any
entanglement between the [religious insititution] and the government which is manifested in this
case was caused by the [religious institution] when it hired lay teachers and, as an employer within
the meaning of the Act, brought itself under the jurisdiction of the Act." Id. at 418 n.7. Accord,
King's Garden, Inc. v. FCC, 498 F.2d 51, 60 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 996 (1974) (when
religiously affiliated organization chooses to engage in enterprise that affects commerce, it must
accept same obligation to respect laws imposed on similar enterprises not having a religious affili-
ation.); Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1003 (D.C.
Cir. 1966) (religious group awarded FCC radio station license is no different from any other
group; must take its franchise "burdened by enforceable public obligations.").
31. Association of Hebrew Teachers of Metropolitan Detroit, 210 N.L.R.B. 1053, 86
L.R.R.M. 1249 (1974) (jurisdiction over religious school declined because after-school, supple-
mentary character of activity had little impact on interstate commerce); Board of Jewish Educ. of
Greater Washington, D.C., 210 N.L.R.B. 1037, 86 L.R.R.M. 1253 (1974) (jurisdiction over reli-
gious organization engaged in supplemental education with no facilities of its own declined be-
cause its activities were noncommercial in nature).
32. Association of Hebrew Teachers of Metropolitan Detroit, 210 N.L.R.B. 1053, 1058, 86
L.R.R.M. 1249, 1251 (1974).
33. 216 N.L.R.B. 249, 88 L.R.R.M. 1169 (1975).
34. Id. at 250, 88 L.R.R.M. at 1171. Applying this standard to the five Baltimore-area Catho-
lic high schools, the Board concluded that religious secondary schools teaching secular subjects
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In NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago35 Chief Justice Burger, on
behalf of the majority, could "see no escape from conflicts flowing from
the Board's exercise of jurisdiction over teachers in church-operated
schools and the consequent serious First Amendment questions that
would follow."36 Although the majority did not determine whether the
Board's assertion of jurisdiction in this case did, in fact, infringe upon
the first amendment, the majority reasoned that the circumstances
presented a "significant risk" of excessive governmental entangle-
ment.37 "The critical and unique role of the teacher in fulfilling the
mission of a church-operated school" created a danger that religious
doctrine would become intertwined with secular education.38  The
NLRB's inquiry into unfair labor practice charges and its determina-
tion of the mandatory subjects of bargaining might also impinge upon
rights guaranteed by religion clauses.39 Thus, under the canon of statu-
tory construction laid down in Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo4 °
and McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacionale Marineros de Honduras,41 the
fall within the category of "just religiously associated" institutions. Id. Cf. Catholic Bishop of
Chicago v. NLRB, 559 F.2d 1112, 1119 (7th Cir. 1977) (all distinctions, including those made by
Board, are unworkable because any secular activity renders group "merely religiously associ-
ated"). See also First Church of Christ, Scientist, 194 N.L.R.B. 1006, 79 L.R.R.M. 1135 (1972);
Sunday School Bd. Southern Baptist, 92 N.L.R.B. 801, 27 L.R.R.M. 1153 (1950); Note, Establish-
ment Clause Analysis of Legislative and Adminstrative Aid to Religion, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 1175,
1182-83 (1974) (analysis of Supreme Court decisions indicates tripartite division: pervasively reli-
gious (churches and seminaries); materially religious (most parochial schools); and substantially
secular (church-affiliated colleges)).
35. 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
36. Id. at 504.
37. Id. at 502.
38. Id. at 501. "Whether the subject is 'remedial reading,' 'advanced reading,' or simply
'reading,' a teacher remains a teacher, and the danger that religious doctrine will become inter-
twined with secular instruction persists." Id. (quoting Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 370
(1975)). Accord, Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971):
In terms of potential for involving some aspect of faith or morals in secular subjects, a
textbook's content is ascertainable, but a teacher's handling of a subject is not. We can-
not ignore the danger that a teacher under religious control and discipline poses to the
separation of the religious from the purely secular aspects of pre-college education. The
conflict of functions inheres in the situation.
Id. at 617.
39. 440 U.S. at 502. The NLRB argued that excessive entanglement could be avoided be-
cause it would resolve only factual issues such as whether the employer acted out of anti-union
animus. Id. The Court, however, rejected this view, arguing that resolution of many unfair labor
practice charges would require the Board to inquire into "the good faith of the position asserted
by the clergy-administrators and its relationship to the school's religious mission." Id.
40. 353 U.S. 183 (1957).
41. 372 U.S. 10 (1963).
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Court would resolve the first amendment issues only if the "affirmative
intention of the Congress clearly expressed" mandated the conclusion
that Congress intended to bring church-operated schools within the
purview of the NLRA.42
Although conceding that Congress defined the NLRB's jurisdiction
in broad terms, the majority stressed that the NLRA's language offered
"no clear expression of an affirmative intention of Congress" that the
NLRB exercise jurisdiction over teachers in church-operated schools. 43
The Court also turned to the legislative history of the NLRA to de-
termine Congress' intention. Chief Justice Burger first noted that in
enacting the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, Congress focused
on employment in private industry and gave no consideration to relig-
iously affiliated schools. ' The Chief Justice also observed that the leg-
42. 440 U.S. at 504. In its brief, respondent argued precisely for this approach. Brief for
Respondent at 39-42, NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490 (1979). The majority, in fact, incor-
porated verbatim into its opinion certain parts of respondent's brief arguing for resolution of the
case through statutory construction rather than first amendment analysis.
"Affirmative intention of Congress clearly expressed" first emerged as a canon of statutory con-
struction for determining the NLRB's jurisdiction in Benz and received additional support in
McCulloch. Because the Board's assertion ofjurisdiction over foreign seamen implicated sensitive
issues concerning the power of the Executive over relations with foreign nations, the Court de-
clined to interpret the NLRA to grant jurisdiction in the absence of an "affirmative intention of
Congress clearly expressed." 372 U.S. at 21-22; 353 U.S. at 144. Chief Justice Burger found this
canon binding on the Court in Catholic Bishop because of the equally sensitive nature of religious
freedom. 440 U.S. at 500.
43. 440 U.S. at 504.
44. Id See, e.g., 79 CONG. REc. 7573 (1935) (remarks of Sen. Wagner). The majority added:
"It is not without significance, however, that the Senate Committee on Education and Labor chose
a college professor's dispute with the college as an example of employer-employee relations not
covered by the Act." 440 U.S. at 504-05 (emphasis in original). See S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong.,
1st Sess. 7 (1935):
The term "labor dispute" includes cases where the disputants do not stand in the proxi-
mate relation of employer and employee. . . . This definition does not mean that the
Government could intervene in a "dispute" between an employer and, let us say, a criti-
cal college professor, for jurisdiction under this bill depends upon the charge of an unfair
labor practice affecting commerce, and there could be no such practice involving the
employer and the college professor. But unfair labor practices may, by promoting a
sympathetic strike, for example, create a dispute affecting commerce between an em-
ployer and employees between whom there is no proximate relationship. Liberal courts
and Congress have already recognized that employers and employees not in proximate
relationship may be drawn into common controversies by economic forces. There is no
reason why this bill should adopt a narrower view, or prevent action by the government
when such a controversy occurs.
The majority clearly misread this example to buttress its view. The report refers to a college
professor who complains to an employer with whom he does not stand in the proximate relation-
ship of employer and employee. Because the Catholic Bishop case involves a proximate employ-
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islative history of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (Taft-
Hartley),45 Congress' next major consideration of the Board's jurisdic-
tion, demonstrated a consensus that "nonprofit institutions in general
did not fall within the Board's jurisdiction because they did not affect
commerce." 46 Finally, the majority asserted that the National Labor
Relations Act Amendments of 1974,47 which removed the exemption
enacted in 1947 for nonprofit hospitals evidenced no affirmative con-
gressional intention that the NLRB extend its jurisdiction to religiously
affiliated schools. 48 Because the Board first asserted jurisdiction over
nonprofit church-operated schools only after the 1974 amendment, the
repeal of the nonprofit hospital exemption could not reflect tacit con-
gressional approval of the Board's actions.49
Justice Brennan, writing for the four-member dissent, accused the
majority of inventing a canon of statutory construction for the purpose
of deciding this case.5 0 The majority incorrectly used Benz and McCul-
loch to require an "affirmative intention of Congress clearly expressed"
to find jurisdiction in the Board, because these cases turned in part on
legislative history indicating that Congress did not intend the NLRA to
encompass foreign seamen." The Court needed to find clear congres-
sional expression in these cases to counteract the contrary legislative
history. Absent negative expressions, however,52 the Court need only
determine whether a construction of the statute is "fairly possible" by
which the constitutional issue may be avoided, rather than require a
clear congressional expression in favor of that construction.
Justice Brennan also suggested that "clear expression of an affirma-
tive intention of Congress" is the canon of judicial construction applied
in those cases in which the constitutionality of the Board's jursidiction
is clear and the only question is whether Congress intended to grant
ment relationship, the committee's example is irrelevant to the NLRA's applicability to lay
teachers employed by church-operated schools.
45. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-191 (1976).
46. 440 U.S. at 505.
47. Pub. L. No. 93-360, 88 Stat. 395 (1974) (amending 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1970)).
48. 440 U.S. at 505.
49. Id. at 505-06.
50. Id. at 508 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justices White, Marshall, and Blackmun joined Jus-
tice Brennan in dissent.
51. Id. at 509-10 n.l. See note 42 supra.
52. "As the Court today admits, there is no such contrary legislative history or precedent with
respect to jurisdiction over church-operated schools." 440 U.S. at 510 n.l.
Number 11
Washington University Open Scholarship
182 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
such jursidiction." When the constitutionality of the Board's assertion
of jurisdiction is itself in question, the proper canon calls for the Court
to determine whether a construction of the statute is "fairly possible"
by which the constitutional question may be avoided. 4
In looking at the language of the Act, the dissent argued that the
majority's construction of the NLRA to exclude lay teachers employed
by church-related schools from the NLRB's jurisdiction was not "fairly
possible?'"5 and, in fact, "plainly wrong."56 Justice Brennan first noted
that the NLRA defines "employer" as any person not within one of the
eight express exceptions 7.5  Thus, the manner in which Congress for-
mulated the definition does not allow for judicial contruction of "one
more exception-for church-operated schools." 58  Furthermore, con-
struction of another exception would not comport with those provisions
of the Act which have been interpreted to make the Board's jurisdiction
coextensive with Congress' jurisdictional breadth under the commerce
clause. 59
The dissent further maintained that the majority incorrectly inter-
preted the NLRA's legislative history. The Hartley bill, which passed
the House in 1947, would have provided an exemption for nonprofit
organizations, including religious associations.6 0 The Senate, however,
proposed to limit the nonprofit exemption to hospitals,6 1 and the House
53. Id.
54. Id. See note 11 supra and accompanying text.
55. 440 U.S. at 511 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 508.
57. Id. at 511 (Brennan, J., dissenting). NLRA § 2(2), 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1976), provides:
The term "employer" includes any person acting as an agent of an employer, directly
or indirectly, but shall not include the United States or any wholly owned Government
corporation, or any Federal Reserve Bank, or any State or political subdivision thereof,
or any person subject to the Railway Labor Act, as amended from time to time, or any
labor organization (other than when acting as an employer), or anyone acting in the
capacity of officer or agent of such labor organization.
58. 440 U.S. at 511 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
59. See notes 22 supra, 75 infra and accompanying text.
60. Section 2(2) of the Hartley bill stated:
The term "employer" . . . shall not include ...any corporation, community chest,
fund, or foundation organized exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or
educational purposes. . . no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of
any private shareholder or individual ....
H. REP. No. 3020, 80th Cong., Ist Sess., reprintedin LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TH LABOR MAN-
AGEMENT RELATIONS AcT, 1947, at 161-62 (1947) (emphasis added).
61. Senator Tydings offered, and the Senate agreed to, an amendment excluding from the
definition of employer "any corporation or association operating a hospital, if no part of the net
earnings inure to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual." S. 1126, 80th Cong., 1st
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accepted the Senate version in conference committee.62 Thus, the dis-
sent concluded, Congress explicitly rejected the exception that the ma-
jority would read into the Act.63 Justice Brennan also pointed to
Congress' repeal of the nonprofit hospital exemption in 1974,64 which
the dissent interpreted to confirm the view that Congress intended the
NLRA to cover all employers not expressly excluded from its provi-
sions.65 Moreover, when Congress repealed the nonprofit hospital ex-
emption in 1974, the Senate expressly rejected an attempt to leave
intact the exemption for hospitals operated by religious organizations.66
Sess. § 2(2), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT,
1947, at 99, 102 (1947).
62. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1970) (amended 1974).
63. 440 U.S. at 515. The inference to be drawn from the House's acceptance of the Senate's
limitation of the exemption to nonprofit hospitals is less clear than the dissent characterizes it.
The conference committee report expounded:
The conference agreement follows the provisions of the House Bill in the matter of
agents of an employer, and follows the Senate amendment in the matter of exclusion of
nonprofit corporations and associations operating hospitals. The other nonprofit organi-
zations excluded under the House Bill are not specifically excluded in the conference
agreement, for only in exceptional circumstances and in connection with purely commer-
cial activities of such organizations have any of the activities of such organizations or of
their employees been considered as affecting commerce so as to bring them within the
scope of the National Labor Relations Act.
H. ReP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1947). Two commentators, however, explain:
The supposed Board practice of taking jurisdiction "only in exceptional circumstances
and in connection with purely commercial activities" appears to have first been verbal-
ized, with neither approval nor criticism, in the House minority report and was later
adoped by the House conferees as a tactical attempt to portray the decision to recede to
the narrow senate exemption as a concession without consequence.
Sherman & Black, The Labor Board andthe Private Nonprofit Employer.- .4 Critical Examination of
the Board's Worthy Cause Exemption, 83 HARv. L. REv. 1323, 1336 (1970). The authors thus
conclude:
The much relied upon conference report, then, may be seen as, at best, a statement of
some members of the House as to their understanding of the NLRB's jurisdiction under
the commerce clause in May of 1947 and, at worst, a totally inaccurate representation of
supposed NLRB policy prior to that date.
Id. at 1336. This conclusion also comports with the NLRB's contemporaneous construction of the
1947 amendment that Congress intended to exempt only nonprofit hospitals. See, e.g., Sunday
School Bd. of the Southern Baptist Convention, 92 N.L.R.B. 801, 802, 27 L.R.R.M. 1153, 1154
(1950) (immaterial that nonprofit organization engaged in purely religious activities). Seealso 440
U.S. at 514 n.6 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
64. National Labor Relations Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-360, 88 Stat. 395
(amending 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1970)).
65. 440 U.S. at 514 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
66. Id. Senator Cranston, floor manager of the Senate bill, stated:
[An exception for religiously affiliated hospitals would seriously erode the existing na-
tional policy which holds religiously affiliated institutions generally such as proprietary
nursing homes, residential communities, and educational facilities to the same standards
as their nonsectarian counterparts.
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Finally, the dissent accused the majority of being disloyal to its own
precedents. In particular, Justice Brennan cited Associated Press v.
NLRB,6 7 in which the Court held that the first amendment posed no
barrier to the application of the NLRA to editorial employees of a non-
profit news-gathering organization.6 8 The dissent contended that the
risk of infringing first amendment guarantees in Associated Press was
no less than in the present case, yet the Court did not resort to statutory
construction to limit the NLRB's jurisidiction and thus avoid the first
amendment issue.69  Furthermore, the majority's holding did not
square with the Court's consistent declarations that "in passing the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, Congress intended to and did vest in the
Board the fullest jurisdictional breadth constitutionally permissible
under the Commerce Clause. 70
The general principle of construing statutes to avoid unnecessy con-
stitutional decisions is well settled, but the majority's canon for effectu-
ating that principle is clearly incorrect. An "affirmative intention of
Congress clearly expressed" for a particular statutory construction, as
the dissent properly pointed out,7 1 is both inapplicable under the
rationales of Benz and McCulloch and reserved for cases in which the
constitutionality of the Board's assertion of jurisdiction is conceded and
the sole issue is whether Congress intended to empower the Board to
act under the particular circumstances. In Catholic Bishop the constitu-
tionality of the Board's exercise ofjursidiction was itself in contention;
thus, the majority should have limited itself to ascertaining whether a
construction of the NLRA was "fairly possible" by which the first
amendment issues could be avoided. The difference in canons is real.
The majority's canon, in effect, permits the Court to limit the applica-
tion of a congressional enactment whenever Congress fails to make ex-
120 CONG. REC. 12957 (1974), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE COVERAGE OF NON-
PROFIT HOSPITALS UNDER THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS AcT, 1974, at 137 (1974).
67. 301 U.S. 103 (1937).
68. Id. at 130.
69. 440 U.S. at 517 n.10 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissent also argued that the majority's
resort to statutory construction to avoid the first amendment issues was fruitless, Because the
majority limited the jurisdictional exemption to church-operated schools rather than to all non-
profit educational institutions, it accorded special treatment to religiously affiliated schools. Thus,
the majority evasion of the free exercise clause issue resulted in an equally difficult establishment
clause problem. Id. at 518 n. 11. See text accompanying notes 15-20 supra.
70. NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 371 U.S. 224, 226 (1963). See note 22 supra and
accompanying text.
71. See notes 53-54 supra and accompanying text.
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plicit expressions on the scope of the statute in relation to the facts of a
particular case. Such expressions of congressional intent are not com-
monplace-or even reasonably feasible-in broadly inclusive regula-
tory statutes. The dissent's canon, in contrast, allows the Court to
narrow the jursidiction of a regulatory body only when no construction
is "fairly possible" by which exercise of that jurisdiction would violate
a constitutional provision. The burden is not on Congress to make
clear that it did intend to grant jurisdiction in a situation that implicates
a constitutional question; rather, the burden is on the Court to deter-
mine that Congress didnot, by any reasonable construction of the stat-
ute, intend to empower the regulatory body to act in that situation.72
The dissent also marshalled the more persuasive legislative history in
its behalf. Although the majority is correct that Congress, when it en-
acted the NLRA in 1935, focused its attention exclusively on private
industry, the dissent makes the more significant point that Congress
intended the NLRB to exercise jurisdiction over any industry "affecting
commerce."7 3 That religious schools, therefore, had no impact on com-
merce in 1935-and thus did not draw congressional attention at that
time-does not evince a congressional intent to exclude church-oper-
ated schools from the purview of the Act today in light of the substan-
tial growth of these institutions74 and the significant expansion of the
commerce power."
72. In the words of the dissent:
This limitation to constructions that are "fairly possible" and "reasonable". . . acts as a
brake against wholesale dismemberment of congressional enactments. It confines the
judiciary to its proper role in construing statutes, which is to interpret them so as to give
effect to congressional intention. The Court's new "affirmative expression" rule releases
that brake.
440 U.S. at 510- 1i (Brennan, J., dissenting).
73. During debate on the original NLRA in 1935, the following interchange occurred be-
tween Senator Wagner, the bill's sponsor, and Senator Costigan:
Mr. Costigan. Is it proper to say that the [NLRAI is designed to apply to all industries
which affect commerce?
Mr. Wagner. That is the intent.
79 CONG. REC. 7573 (1935). Section 5(1) of the Act defines "industry affecting commerce" as "any
industry or activity in commerce or in which a labor dispute would burden or obstruct commerce
or the free flow of commerce." 29 U.S.C. § 155(1) (1976).
74. See note 28 supra and accompanying text.
75. "Legislation enacted under this constitutional grant has been interpreted in accordance
with evolving standards of congressional power rather than by reference to the historical state of
the law at the time of passage of each particular act." See, e.g., Perez v. United States, 402 U.S.
146 (1971) (Consumer Credit Protection Act applies to purely local loan shark operation because
of nexus between organized crime and interstate commerce even though defendant was not per-
sonally associated with organized crime); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (civil
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Similarly, the majority's reliance on the 1947 amendments to the
NLRA is misplaced. Whatever "consensus" the majority found in the
legislative history that "nonprofit institutions in general did not fall
within the Board's jursidiction because they did not affect commerce"
must give way to the dissent's point that the Board's jurisdiction is de-
fined in accordance with the evolving commerce power rather than by
reference to the state of the law at the time of the NLRA's enactment.76
Furthermore, this consensus is highly questionable in light of Congress'
explicit rejection in 1947 of an exemption for religious employers and
its analogous rejection in 1974 of an amendment to exclude church-
operated hospitals from the Board's jurisdiction.77
Finally, the majority's analysis of Associated Press is incomplete.
Chief Justice Burger stated that nothing in the case suggested that ap-
plication of the NLRA to the Associated Press would infringe upon the
first amendment guarantees of freedom of the press. 78 He thus dis-
tinguished Catholic Bishop on the ground that "the record affords
abundant evidence that the Board's exercise of jurisdiction over teach-
ers in church-operated schools would implicate the guarantees of the
Religion Clauses. '79 The majority's reexplanation of Associated Press,
however, is unsatisfactory. Why the majority saw no risk of constitu-
tional infirmity in the Board's exercise of jurisdiction over a news or-
ganization is not clear. Presumably, the NLRB concerns itself with the
same aspects of an employment relationship whether that relationship
exists between a publisher and its reporter or between church-operated
schools and its teachers. Yet, the majority failed to explain how the
Board's "entanglement" with religion would be any greater than its in-
terference with freedom of the press.80
rights act applies to small local restaurant far from interstate highway because restaurant
purchased 46% of its meat from local supplier who procured meat from outside the state); Heart of
Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (commerce power reaches motel, readily ac-
cessible from the interstate highway, that solicits interstate patrons); Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S.
111 (1942) (Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 applies to exclusively local activity and private
consumption of farmer harvesting 239 bushels of wheat over his quota).
76. See notes 22, 75 supra and accompanying text.
77. See notes 60-66 supra and accompanying text.
78. 440 U.S. at 507.
79. Id.
80. If the majority meant to distinguish Catholic Bshop by relying on the Court's holding in
Associated Press-that the Board's exercise of jurisdiction would not constitute an impermissible
infringement of the first amendment-then its analysis is flawed. As the majority stated at the
outset of its opinion, it is the risk of infringement, not its actual existence, that triggers the Court's
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The Supreme Court went to great lengths in NLRB v. Catholic
Bishop to avoid meeting the first amendment challenge to the NLRA's
application to lay teachers in church-operated schools. To do so, the
majority was unfaithful not only to the statute's language and legisla-
tive history, but also to the Court's own precedents. Most importantly,
however, the majority applied a canon of statutory construction that, if
invoked in other contexts, may again lead to undesirable judicial exer-
cises of the legislative function.
attempt to avoid the constitutional issues through statutory construction. See note 37 supra and
accompanying text.
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